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INTRODUCTION
It is a somewhat surreal experience to come back to Boulder as a
government official. But in many important respects, I never really left.
My perspectives on innovation, entrepreneurship, and the role of
competition policy were shaped by my experiences and my work here.
And they are among the important topics I am now focused on at the
Department of Justice. So to bring my work in this area full circle, I will
be talking about these topics today, discussing the role of
entrepreneurship in our information age, how competition catalyzes
entrepreneurship and innovation, and how antitrust law provides the
foundation for competitive markets. Finally, I will touch on the
institutional challenges that antitrust enforcers must confront in order to
act effectively in dynamic markets.
I.

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE
INFORMATION AGE

For most of the 20th century, AT&T represented the
telecommunications industry and the effort to regulate it was

* Deputy Assistant Attorney General for International, Policy, and Appellate Matters at
the US Department of Justice; Professor of Law, University of Colorado (on leave). Thanks to
Carl Shapiro for helpful comments, Eric Citron for his valuable research assistance, and the
editors at the JTHTL for their outstanding work on the article.
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telecommunications policy. To that end, the company that Theodore
Vail once championed as providing "one system, one policy, universal
service" was indeed responsible for an explosion of telephone penetration,
the employment of over a million Americans, and highly valuable basic
research in its vaunted Bell Labs.' But that same company also
suppressed innovation in the marketplace-thwarting the introduction of
products that connected to its phone system, thumbing its nose at the
development of the Internet, and taking its time in pursuing the
development of mobile telephony.' It also operated as only a monopolist
could, declining, for example, to purchase fiber optic technology from its
inventor, Dow Corning, only doing so once competition (from upstarts
MCI and Sprint) forced its hand.'
Promoting competition and entrepreneurship, as was eventually
done in the telecommunications industry, is an essential component of
innovation policy. In this respect, the United States enjoys an important
advantage over other countries because, as The Economist put it,
"entrepreneurialism is so deeply rooted in [our] history."' And indeed,
the U.S. strength in entrepreneurship undoubtedly benefits from a
willingness of entrepreneurs and businesses to take risks. This is part of
what enables entrepreneurs to try, and then ultimately, to succeed.s In
other countries, by contrast, the view of failure as a badge of infamy can
undermine risk-taking behavior, discourage entrepreneurship, and
eliminate a major source of innovation.
There are a number of critical factors, in addition to our
entrepreneurial DNA, that explain and continue to fuel the U.S.
entrepreneurial engine.' First, a strong domestic venture capital system
provides the essential fuel for entrepreneurial startup activity,
dramatically shaping our ability to drive innovation and economic
growth. Second, the U.S. system of higher education is a crown jewel of
our entrepreneurial engine; consider, for example, that half of the startup firms in Silicon Valley reportedly are rooted in some fashion to
Stanford University.! Third, the model of working for a single company
1. STEVE COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T 8 (1986).
2. Id.
3. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
4. Adrian Wooldridge, Global Heroes: A Special Report on Entrepreneurship,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 2009, at 6.
5. As Michael Porter put it: "Only in America can young people raise millions, lose it
all, and return to start another company.. . . Our willingness to restructure, take our losses,
and move on will allow the U.S. to weather the current crisis better than most countries."
Michael E. Porter, Why America Needs an Economic Strategy, BUS. WK., Nov. 10, 2008, at 40.
6. For an extensive discussion of these factors, see EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION: DRIVING TOWARDS
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND QUALITYJOBS (2009) [hereinafter Strategy for Innovation].
7. Wooldridge, supra note 4, at 7.
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over the course of one's career-being an "IBM man," to take a 1960s
example-is largely a relic of history. As The Economist recently put it,
"[i]n the 1960s workers had had an average of four different employers
by the time they reached 65. Today they have had eight by the time they
are 30."' With that change, people are forced to take a more
entrepreneurial attitude toward their own careers.
A final driver of entrepreneurship is our strength in three industries
that are facilitating innovation at a greater pace than ever before: the
computer, the mobile phone, and the Internet. Taken together, these
technologies are-as Eric von Hippel put it-democratizing innovation.9
After all, in today's world, a startup can easily gain computing power by
contracting with Amazon (for access to its cloud computing capacity on a
pay-as-you-go basis), develop an application that can immediately
become a hit for the iPhone, or reach large audiences by establishing a
respected blog (as Nate Silver has done at fivethirtyeight.com, using his
statistics expertise to reimagine political polling).
The impact of entrepreneurship in the information age is being felt
across the globe. Increasingly, entrepreneurs are finding business models
that can deliver the information age to populations around the world.
Consider, for example, how Iqbal Quadir, a Bangladeshi who emigrated
to the U.S., developed a plan for using microfinance to enable women in
villages to buy mobile phones and charge for access to them. Based on
that plan, Bangladesh now has over 270,000 "phone ladies," who, using a
specially designed mobile phone with long-lasting batteries, are selling
minutes to local villagers. The venture now enjoys annual revenues in the
neighborhood of $1 billion-all by tapping an entrepreneurial spirit and
hunger for access to the information age.10
The dynamics of today's information age have pushed economists
further away from the classic, static focus on prices-which remains an
important part of economics, to be sure-to a greater appreciation for the
impact of innovation. The godfather of this perspective, of course, is
Joseph Schumpeter, who emphasized the opportunity for "gale[s] of
creative destruction" to transform markets." Stanford's Paul Romer
offers a different metaphor to make the same point-"[e]conomic
growth occurs whenever people take resources and rearrange them in
ways that make them more valuable.

. .

. [It] springs from better recipes,

not just more cooking."
8. Id. at 5.
9. ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005).
10. Wooldridge, supra note 4, at 4.
11. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY, 82
(1942).
12. Paul Romer, Economic Growth, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
(David R. Henderson, ed. Liberty Fund 2008) (1993).
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The international dynamics of entrepreneurship are spurring
competition between countries-and cities-to welcome start-up
businesses. In this respect, the Thomas Friedman suggestion of a "flat
world" captures an important insight that was well qualified by Richard
Florida, who remarked that "the world is spiky."13 By that, Florida
explained that "the tallest peaks [where innovation takes place]-the
cities and regions that drive the world economy-are growing ever
higher, while the valleys [which can be in the same countries as some of
those peaks] mostly languish."14 The World Bank, in an effort to spur
(and judge) the effectiveness of countries' efforts to welcome
entrepreneurial activity, began in 2003 to publish an annual report
entitled Doing Business.'5 In that report, it measured how different
countries handled business regulations, enforced property rights, and
enjoyed access to credit. Moreover, it underscored the connection
between economic prosperity and a welcoming attitude toward business.
Consider, for example, the impact on entrepreneurship where
governments can engage in hold-up-in effect, asking for a piece of a
successful business without having to share in the risk on the front end.
Such a practice, which takes place when there is a culture of corruption
(as opposed to a commitment to the rule of law), is toxic to the
entrepreneurial spirit. A milder, but still toxic pollutant, is the tendency
of many countries' regulations to delay for months or years the ability of
entrepreneurs to start new businesses.
As The Economist reported, this project of "naming and shaming"
countries to improve their business climate has spurred more than 1,000
reforms and enabled countries to learn from and be inspired by the steps
that others take.'" And such reforms need not be limited to developing
nations. On account of its commitment to entrepreneurship, Canada
now enables individuals to start a business with just one procedure.
Underscoring the importance of the dynamics spurred by the Doing
Business report, Robert Litan, of the Kauffman Foundation, suggests that
the World Bank "may have done more good by compiling Doing Business
than by lending much of the money that it has.""
One fascinating dynamic in today's entrepreneurial economy is that
the world is simultaneously more locally driven and more interlinked. It
is more local because clusters of business start-up and expansion activity
can create local symbiotic relationships that fuel further growth and

13. Richard Florida, The World is Spiky, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2005, at 48.
14. Id.
15. THE WORLD BANK GROUP, THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS (2010),
http://www.doingbusiness.org (interactive online format).
16. Wooldridge, supra note 4, at 9.
17. Id.
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innovation; it is more interlinked because ongoing technological
development and races to innovate have created internationally
interconnected networks for product development, production, and
distribution. A key challenge, recognized and engaged by the Obama
Administration's Strategyfor American Innovation, is understanding how
best to balance these local and global forces." For countries, it creates an
awkward dynamic insofar as modern economic forces are making both
local geography and global connections more important. Thus, to be
economically successful, countries must both support local economic
clusters to spur entrepreneurship and innovation as well as participate
and compete in global markets.19 In short, any successful innovation
policy in today's information age depends on clear and effective
competition policy.
II.

ANTITRUST LAW AND THE COMPETITIVE MODEL

Antitrust law, unlike classic command-and-control regulation, is the
friend of entrepreneurs because it works in service of the free market (and
not as a substitute for it).2 0 Along these very lines, Justice Breyer once
explained that:
[A]ntitrust is not another form of regulation. Antitrust is an
alternative to regulation and, where feasible, a better alternative. To
be more specific, the classicist first looks to the marketplace to
protect the consumer; he relies upon the antitrust laws to sustain
market competition. He turns to regulation only where free markets
policed by antitrust laws will not work-where he finds significant
18. Strategy for Innovation, supra note 6, at 9 ("It is imperative to create a national
environment ripe for entrepreneurship and risk taking that allows U.S. companies to be
internationally competitive in a global exchange of ideas and innovation. Through competitive
markets, innovations diffuse and scale appropriately across industries and globally."); id. at 17
(noting value of regional innovation clusters); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
AND
DEv.,
OECD
INNOVATION
STRATEGY
(2010),
http://www.oecd.org/innovation/strategy.
19. On the economic clusters point, Michael Porter reported that:
[T]he task of forming economic policy and putting it into practice is highly
decentralized across states and regions. There really is not a single U.S. economy,
but a collection of specialized regional economies-think of the entertainment
complex in Hollywood or life sciences in Boston. Each region has its own industry
clusters, with specialized skills and assets. Each state and region takes responsibility
for competitiveness and addresses its own problems rather than waiting for the
central government. This decentralization is arguably America's greatest hidden
competitive strength.
Porter, supra note 5.
20. See Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990)
("Economic regulators seek to achieve [consumer welfare] directly by controlling prices
through rules and regulations; antitrust seeks to achieve [this goal] indirectly by promoting and
preserving a [competitive] process ..... (emphases omitted)).
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market 'defects' that antitrust laws cannot cure. Only then is it worth
gearing up the cumbersome, highly imperfect bureaucratic apparatus
of classical regulation. Regulation is viewed as a substitute for
competition, to be used only as a weapon of last resort-as a heroic
cure reserved for a serious disease. 21
The impact of regulation can be more problematic than its
"imperfect bureaucratic apparatus." In particular, regulated firms
frequently develop a comfort level with their regulator, use government
to raise barriers to entry, and, in some cases, remain protected from
competition. Consider, for example, the old model of regulation for the
airline industry. Under that model, Southwest Airlines was relegated to
competing only in Texas, as the State of Texas authorized competition in
the intrastate market while the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") refused
to allow Southwest to enter the interstate air transport market.22
Similarly, AT&T took advantage of the FCC's willingness to bar entry,
in one case famously restricting the use of a plastic, cup-like device that
was used to provide greater levels of privacy protection when using a
telephone. The D.C. Circuit's reversal of the FCC decision in that
case-known as the "Hush-A-Phone" decision 2 3-effectively set off the
deregulatory process that culminated, through an antitrust consent
decree, in the break-up of AT&T.
The flip side of the antitrust-regulation dynamic is that, for markets
that are not natural monopolies, sound antitrust policy can guard against
undue concentration, ensure the possibility of entry, and prevent
incumbent firms from protecting their position through abusive
practices. It is this dynamic, and the role of antitrust law in protecting
entrepreneurship and disruptive entry, that I want to focus on today.24
Before doing so, however, I must acknowledge a couple of intellectual
debts.

21. Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly LiberatedMarketplace, 75
CAL. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1987) (emphasis omitted).
22. At least until Fred Kahn and others spearheaded a regulatory reform effort that
deregulated the industry. See Philip J. Weiser, Alfed Kahn as a Case Study of a Political
Entrepreneur:An Essay in Honour of his 90th Birthday, 7 REV. NETWORK ECON. 603, 605-09
(2008) (describing Kahn's spearheading of regulatory reform).
23. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
24. A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION also makes this point:
In many industries, small companies are critical innovators, bringing enormous
benefits to consumers while putting competitive pressure on incumbent firms. The
Obama Administration is committed to enforcing the antitrust laws to insure that
innovative entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market by anti-competitive
conduct. The Department of Justice actively investigates allegations of exclusionary
conduct as part of its law enforcement mission to keep markets open and
competitive.
Strategy for Innovation, supra note 6, at 17.
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First, for all of us in the antitrust world, Michael Porter's work
provides important inspiration and guidance. In particular, Porter's work
underscores that nations with vibrant traditions of competition policy
develop stronger companies prepared to compete in the world
economy. 25 By contrast, Porter explains, protectionist policies-through
regulation or otherwise-undermine the pressures for innovation that
come from competition.26 To that end, Porter explains in considerable
part that America's economic engine rests on the fact that it has a
steadfast "commitment to competition and free markets," driving a
"remarkable level of restructuring, renewal, and productivity growth in
the U.S."27 Moreover, Porter explains, that strength requires active
antitrust enforcement, including guarding against undue concentration
that can allow single firms to dominate markets, thereby undermining
competition and innovation.
Second, on the point of connecting the importance of competition
and innovation, my teacher, F.M. Scherer, both appreciated
Schumpeter's focus on innovation and highlighted how he erred in
evaluating what spurs innovation. In particular, Scherer's research led
him to the conclusion that Schumpeter's suggestion that monopolies
would innovate better than competitive markets was "more wrong than
right," concluding that "giant monopolistic corporations were not
uniquely efficacious engines of technological advance."29 Indeed, as
empirical analyses by Scherer and others have found, smaller firms tend
to be more aggressive innovators,30 even in cases where the large firms are
the ones who sponsor the relevant basic research."' In short, as Scherer
25. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND
SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (1998).
26. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 29 (1980).
27. Porter, supra note 5.
28. Porter, supra note 25, at 206.
29. F.M. Scherer, An Accidental Schumpeterian, 40 AM. ECONOMIST 5, 13 (1996).
30. See Richard J. Gilbert, Lookingfor Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the CompetitionInnovation Debate? in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159-215 (Adam B. Jaffe
et al. eds., 2006) (highlighting the spur to innovation from competitive market structures);
F.M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 246-47
(1984) (concluding from empirical studies that entrenched monopolists tend to be averse to
innovation for fear that new products will cannibalize revenues from their existing products);
Wesley M. Cohen & Steven Klepper, A Reprise of Size and R & D, 106 ECON. J. 925, 925
(1996) (concluding that, in academic circles, an "enduring consensus emerged long ago that
large firms have no advantages in R & D competition and may even suffer disadvantages"); id.
at 929 ("[S]maller firms accounted for a disproportionately large number of patents and
innovations relative to their size."); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Antitrust, Uncertainty, and
Technological Innovation, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 635, 649 (1979) ("Studies have indicated ...
that small firms are more efficient than larger ones in conducting research.").
31. Consider, for example, the case of Xerox, whose research laboratory-the Xerox Palo
Alto Research Center (PARC)-developed numerous innovations, such as the graphical user
interface and the mouse. Despite the excitement of the engineers who developed these
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and Ross put it, "[t]echnological progress thrives best in an environment
that nurtures a diversity of sizes and, perhaps, especially, that keeps
barriers to entry by technologically innovative newcomers low."3 2 This is,
admittedly, a broad generalization and results vary from industry to
industry, with some industries-like pharmaceuticals-plainly reliant on
economies of scale to invest heavily in research and development efforts
to produce new innovations.
With Porter and Scherer in mind, we can turn to the concept of
"disruptive entry," which invokes Clayton Christensen's concept of
disruptive technologies." Such technologies, Christensen explains, rarely
threaten legacy business models initially because they start out providing
a lower quality version of an established product and serve a small,
underserved segment.34 Over time, however, the quality improvements in
the product or service enable the firm deploying the disruptive
technology to challenge the incumbent's product or service. That
challenge is particularly difficult for the incumbent firm to weather
because its willingness to adopt the technology and business model of the
upstart would involve cannibalizing itself-that is, undercutting its own
legacy model and eroding already profitable lines of business. Few firms
are willing to take that step.
As one example of disruptive technology, consider some of the
changes that the Internet has wrought. For years, established brokers
charged relatively large amounts of money (say, $80-$100) for trades to
buy or sell stocks. Today, the Internet provides a number of choices for
low-cost brokerage services at about $10 per trade. To be sure, those
trades do not come with the hand-holding that the brick-and-mortar
firms offer, but most consumers elect the lower cost offering. For the
classic, established brokers, the advent of Internet-backed brokerage
firms, like Ameritrade and E-Trade, constituted a disruptive technology
that left them with a terrible choice-meet the competition and
cannibalize themselves by offering low-price trades online, or maintain
their old business models and watch their market share erode.35
When confronted with disruptive entry, one tempting response for
incumbents is to ask the regulator for protection. In the case of the
inventions, Xerox failed to recognize their value, declined to commercialize them, and
ultimately enabled the more entrepreneurial upstart, Apple Computer, to be the one to bring
them to market. See MICHAEL A. HILTZIK, DEALERS OF LIGHTNING: XEROX PARC AND
THE DAWN OF THE COMPUTER AGE (1999).
32. FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 660 (Houghton Mifflin Company 3d ed. 1990).
33. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997).
34. See id. at 129.
35. Jerry Useem, InternetDefense Strategy: CannibalizeYourself Fortune, Sept. 6, 1999, at
121.
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Internet-based trading, the established firms were indeed interested in
convincing the SEC to block entry by Internet upstarts.36 This dynamic
makes it enormously important for regulators to adhere to competition
policy principles and to resist the claims of incumbent industry players
that they should be protected against entry.
To provide policymakers with the intellectual fortitude to resist such
pressures, the Antitrust Division engages in competition policy advocacy
that calls out protectionist efforts for what they are. Consider, for
example, comments filed by the Division related to state certificate of
need ("CON") programs in the health care field, which are often a
precondition to opening a new facility. Because CON programs can
restrict entry, they have the ability to impose costs through diminished
competition that can outweigh any purported advantages. In Michigan,
the Division filed comments with the State Senate on the proposed
Certificate of Need standard for Proton Beam Therapy Services. As the
Division letter stated:
The standards [in the proposed legislation] have the potential to
delay or exclude a competing and perhaps superior technology from
entering the marketplace, and therefore may have substantial negative
health consequences for cancer patients in Michigan. By requiring a
majority of the nine largest radiation oncology providers to agree to
collaborate before a certificate of need for a PBT unit will be issued,
the proposed standards create a significant economic incentive for the
current providers of radiation oncology services to protect their
revenues by delaying or defeating entry of a competing product.37
Invoking this very analysis, Michigan Governor Granholm vetoed
the legislation and made clear that a policy of open competition would
best serve Michigan consumers.
Another set of responses by incumbent firms to the threat of
disruptive entry is "self-help"-either individual or collective. By selfhelp, I mean any market practices designed to thwart the success of the
entrant other than competing on the merits. To provide a few tastes of
this dynamic, let me discuss a few notable examples of such conduct, and
discuss the role for antitrust policy in this area.
In the Michigan CON case noted above, it was a set of incumbent
providers who decided to cooperate in supporting a regulatory regime
that would protect their market position and prevent a rival technology

36. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Testing an EmergingMarket; Can Wall St.'s Old Guards
Cope With the New Trading?, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1999, at Cl.
37. Letter from Joseph Miller, Assistant Chief, Litigation I Section, Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice, to Senator Michael D. Bishop, Michigan State Senate
(Jun. 6, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/234407.pdf.
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platform from entering the market. Incumbent firms need not seek
legislation to accomplish this result, however. In the famous Allied Tube
case, for example, a group of producers of metal conduit manipulated the
vote of a standards body to ensure that a rival technology, i.e., one using
plastic conduit, would be far less likely to be certified as safe and, more
broadly, would be viewed as suspect.38 Given that the judgments of the
standards body were often incorporated into local construction codes, the
vote of the body excluded the rival technology from the market. After it
evaluated this course of conduct and the result, the Supreme Court
recognized the competitive harm and consequences entailed by allowing
a group of competitors to cooperate in spurring the standards body to act
in the manner described above. 39
In the area of single-firm conduct, the two leading cases in the last
quarter of the 20th century-US. v. AT&T" and U.S. v. Microsoft"both involved the efforts of an incumbent monopolist to thwart
disruptive entry. In U.S. v. AT&T, the Justice Department's case focused
on the efforts of AT&T to protect its legacy monopoly from would-be
rivals in the equipment manufacturing and long distance markets. In the
equipment market, AT&T used both its control over the interface to the
telephone network and its monopsony power to forestall competition and
the emergence of new technologies. Addressing AT&T's abuse of its
monopoly power in both respects facilitated one of the century's most
impressive innovations: the rise of the Internet. Notably, access to the
telephone network through open interfaces was necessary for the
development and deployment of modems, and the break-up of AT&T
led to the upgrade in long-haul connections, principally through the
deployment of fiber optic technology.
The impact of the AT&T case on the development of the disruptive
entrant who developed fiber optic technology bears particular notice.
Before the AT&T case was settled, AT&T took the position that it did
not want to purchase the technology and, when it did, it would not do so
from a disruptive entrant. As one account related:
AT&T, which owned most of the telephone lines in America at the
time [of the invention of fiber optic technology], said it would be 30
years before its telephone system would be ready for optical fiber.
And when it was, AT&T planned to make its own fiber.... [After

AT&T entered into a consent decree [with the federal government
allowing competition in long distance], MCI took the risk [of
38. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496-97 (1988).
39. Id. at 504.

40. 552 F. Supp. 131, 224 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983).
41. 253 F.3d 34, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
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ordering fiber optic technology] and placed a 100,000 kilometer order
for a new generation of fiber.4 2
In this case, the effectiveness of the antitrust case enabled the
disruptive entrant to prevail. In earlier eras, however, the incumbent
firms were able to stall new entry and implement the very strategy
AT&T envisioned for fiber optics: delaying the new technology and
ultimately deploying it on its own, leaving the innovative entrant with
nothing to show for its entry.
For an example of an entrant receiving insult on top of injury in
return for its innovation, consider the case of Edwin Armstrong.
Armstrong was a Columbia University Engineering Professor and the
inventor of FM radio, who spent over twenty years seeking to convince
the FCC to authorize the use of the technology. During that time, the
established AM broadcasting incumbents (namely, NBC, CBS, and
ABC) engaged in successful delaying tactics at the FCC and, conjoined
with the delays caused by World War II, substantially limited the
development of this technology until Armstrong's patents on the
technology expired. Left broke and despondent, Armstrong committed
suicide in 1954, bemoaning that "'by means of restrictive regulations and
slippery measures, a superior scientific advancement could be
overwhelmed by the shoddy and the expedient."' 43
More recently, US. v. Microsoft raised the core concern that a
dominant firm used its monopoly power to squelch the threat posed by
disruptive technologies. In that case, Netscape's browser product and
Sun's Java technology-as the basis of a middleware platformthreatened to displace Microsoft's monopoly in the operating system
market. Microsoft's response to this threat involved a series of acts
designed to prevent this technology from taking off." In Microsoft, the
remedy provided access to open interfaces (in this case, application
programming interfaces and communications protocols) as a means of
ensuring that Microsoft could not use its control over them to prevent
middleware rivals from emerging in the future.4 5
42. Philip J. Weiser & Dale Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of
PropertyRights, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 549, 605 n.276 (2008) (quoting Telecommunications:
The Role of the DepartmentofJustice: Hearing Before the H Comm. on theJudiciary,104th Cong.
125-26 (1995) (statement of Timothy J. Regan, Division Vice President and Director of
Public Policy, Corning, Inc.)).
43. Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum
Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "BigJoke': An Essay on Air-wave Allocation
Policy, 14 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 335, 412-13 (2001) (quoting LAWRENCE LESSING, MAN OF
HIGH FIDELITY: EDWIN HOWARD ARMSTRONG 273 (1954)).
44. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999), affd, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 165 F.3d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

45. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002).
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III. INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES AND ANTITRUST REMEDIES
In reflecting on the challenges presented to antitrust law by the
emergences of the new economy, Judge Richard Posner commented that
antitrust law is "supple enough" to address dynamic and high technology
issues.46 "The real problem," Posner suggested, "lies on the institutional
side: the enforcement agencies and the courts do not have adequate
technical resources, and do not move fast enough, to cope effectively
with a very complex business sector that changes very rapidly."4 7 I am
very sympathetic to Posner's perspective that antitrust institutions-as
opposed to antitrust doctrine-deserve closer scrutiny. As such, I will
close with a few reflections on this challenge in connection with the
mission of antitrust law to support entrepreneurship by keeping markets
open to the deployment of disruptive technologies.
The first institutional challenge is for antitrust agencies to develop
sufficient market intelligence to know what emerging dynamics pose
threats to established incumbents and may generate reactions of the types
discussed above. This is no small challenge insofar as venture capitalists
are not apt to invest in companies that need an antitrust strategy or, in
the case of already funded companies, to implement an antitrust strategy
in the face of predation that threatens the existence of the start-up firm.
In this sense, Netscape was fortunate that Microsoft did not recognize
the disruptive opportunities of the Internet until Netscape had already
emerged.
To the extent that companies self-regulate and adopt procompetitive responses to the threats of disruptive entry, that is a victory
for the antitrust laws. Indeed, this type of response-which comes from
public awareness of precedents like U.S. v. Microsoft and the effective
counseling by numerous lawyers who advise their clients on what they
can and cannot do-is the heart of the antitrust regime. Notably,
possessing a monopoly does not raise an antitrust concern; after all, as
Judge Learned Hand put it, "[t]he successful competitor, having been
urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins."48
Nonetheless, antitrust enforcers cannot take that compliance for granted
and must evaluate the behavior of dominant firms to ensure that they
don't abuse their monopoly power by excluding rivals from the
marketplace.
The second formidable challenge for antitrust enforcement is to
understand the dynamics of high technology industries so that antitrust
enforcers can evaluate effectively the relevant competitive concern. As

46. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 Antitrust L.J. 925, 925 (2001).
47. Id.

48. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
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Judge Posner concluded and Assistant Attorney General Christine
Varney has reiterated, the antitrust laws apply to technology industries,
meaning that enforcers and courts must develop the analytical tools to
sort "the wheat" (the practices of real concern) "from the chaff' (either
fleeting or benign practices), especially in these rapidly evolving and
complicated fields.' That does not mean that such issues are easy to
understand. In my experience, however, relying on the dedication,
intelligence, and care of the antitrust authorities is our best policy for
addressing competition concerns. By contrast, the culture and sometimes
protectionist traditions of regulatory agencies tend to promote stasis and
be more susceptible to the pressures of the established firms.
The final institutional challenge, and perhaps the most daunting, is
devising appropriate remedies. In my principal stab at this issue, I have
suggested that one promising approach is for antitrust enforcers and
courts to leverage, at least to some extent, the work of existing
institutions, such as standard setting bodies, in responding to
anticompetitive practices.so In the Microsoft consent decree, the oversight
regime took a different approach, establishing a new institution, a
technical committee, to monitor Microsoft's compliance with the decree.
In the Otter Tail case, by contrast, the Supreme Court relied on an
existing institution, the Federal Power Commission, to oversee the terms
of a mandated commitment to provide wholesale wheeling services.51
Whether courts identify existing institutions capable of aiding a remedial
strategy or seek to develop new ones, it is clear that more thought and
care must be devoted to this important area.
CONCLUSION
The role of innovation is critical to our nation's economy and the
antitrust laws are premised on the importance of promoting innovation
through the competitive process. In the case of competition between
established firms, antitrust law is able to function reasonably well insofar
as the relevant issues are very likely to be raised by the parties themselves
and the enforcers will be well positioned to make a decision. The harder
challenges for antitrust enforcers are to address and remedy efforts to
squelch the development of more nascent disruptive entrants. To address
such cases, antitrust enforcers must work hard to identify the relevant
areas of competitive concern, evaluate whether or not the antitrust laws
49. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in
this Challenging Era, Remarks as Prepared Before the Center for American Progress 6-7
(May 11, 2009),.
50. See Philip J. Weiser, Regulating Interoperability:Lessons from AT&T, Microsoft, and
Beyond, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 271 (2009).
51. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 375-77 (1973).
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were violated, and devise appropriate remedies where a violation is
found. This work is every bit as challenging as it is important.

